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AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PRIZE TRIBUNAL
One of the best achievements of The Hague Conference of 1907 was
the scheme for an International Court of Appeal in Prize Cases. The
world was not ready for it, and the differences of view between the
greater and the lesser Powers have not unnaturally prevented its ratifi-
cation. But is it not, under present circumstances, possible that a
shorter step in the same direction might and could be taken by some of
those Powers who are most concerned in the proper disposition of prize
court proceedings?
Madame de Stal declared that mankind was always advancing, but
always in a spiral course. In 1915 the world, while it moved far during
the preceding century or two in the direction of human brotherhood,
seems to have come to a pause very close, so far as commercial inter-
course between nations is concerned, to the point reached at the time
of the French Revolution.
It may be worth while to recall some of the chief departures, at the
end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, from
what had been the accepted rules of international law as to restrictions
of neutral trade.
The French Directory, in 1798, issued a decree that all ships having
for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, should
be held good prize, whoever was the proprietor of such merchandise,
which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its
coming from England or any of its foreign settlements; that the harbors
of France should be shut against all ships having touched in England,
except in cases of distress; and that neutral sailors found on board Eng-
lish vessels might be put to death. President Adams in reference to
this order officially declared that the interest and honor of the United
States commanded them to repel any such "predatory warfare against
the unquestionable rights of neutral commerce."
Two years afterwards Napoleon revoked it, but on November 21,
1806, proclaimed from his camp at Berlin a blockade of the British Isles,
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although it was plain that he could not make it effective. This action
he professed to justify as a measure of retaliation for repeated breaches
of international law on the part of Great Britain. That Power had
issued an Order in Council of May 16, 1806, and made two supplemen-
tary ones of January 7 and November 11, 1807, to the effect that all
ports of France and also those of her allies if, though such allies might
not be at war with Great Britain, they excluded British ships, should be
closed to commerce as fully "as if the same were actually blockaded, in
the most strict and vigorous manner."
Denmark promptly protested and for answer was told by the British
Foreign Office that "the law of nations justifies the employment against
our enemies of the same arms he himself makes use of," and that "if
third parties suffer from these measures, their demand for redress must
be directed against that country which first violates the established
usages of war and the rights of neutral States."
The British Orders in Council, like the decrees of Napoleon, set
forth that they were issued under the right of retaliation or retor-
sion.
In 1811, the validity of one of the series was attacked in a prize case
coming before Sir William Scott (afterwards Lord Stowell). It was in-
sisted by counsel that it was a measure which international law did not
authorize. No English judge had spoken more clearly than he as to
the unity and binding force of that law.' No English judge had been
more emphatic in holding that there cannot be a legal where there is no
actual blockade. But when the last of this line of Orders in Council
(that of April 26, 1809) came before him, in the case in question, which
was one involving American interests, he supported it as an act of retal-
iation, though intimating that otherwise it would have been contrary to
the law of nations.
A court of admiralty, he says, "has its unwritten law evidenced in
the course of its decisions, and collected from the common usage of
civilized States. At the same time, it is strictly true that by the con-
stitution of this country the King in Council possesses legislative rights
over this court, and has power to issue orders and instructions, which it
is bound to obey and enforce, and these constitute the written law of
1 The Maria, 1 C. Robinson's Reports, 340.
HeinOnline  -- 9 Am. J. Int'l L. 298 1915
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PRIZE TRIBUNAL
this court. These two propositions, that the court is bound to adminis-
ter the law of nations, and that it is bound to enforce the King's Orders
in Council, are not at all inconsistent with each other, because these
orders and instructions are presumed to conform themselves, under the
given circumstances, to the principles of international law. They are
either directory applications of those principles to the cases indicated
in them-cases which with all the facts and circumstances belonging to
them, and which constitute their legal character, could be but imper-
fectly known to the court itself; or they are positive regulations, con-
sistent with those principles, applying to matters which require more
exact and definite rules than those general principles are capable of
furnishing."
The establishment of the particular Order of 1809, he continued,
"was doubtless a great and signal departure from the ordinary state
of the exercise of public hostility, but was justified by that extraor-
dinary deviation from the common exercise of hostility in the conduct
of an enemy. * * * It is not an original, independent act of block-
ade, to be governed by the common rules that belong simply to that
operation of law. It is in this instance a counteracting reflex measure,
compelled by the act of the enemy, and as such subject to other con-
siderations arising out of its peculiarly distinctive character. France
declares that the subjects of other States should have no access to Eng-
land: England on that account declared that the subjects of other States
should have no access to France. So far this retaliatory blockade (if
blockade it is to be called) is coextensive with the principle: neutrals
are prohibited to trade with France because they are prohibited by
France from trading with England. England acquires the right, which
it would not otherwise possess to prohibit the intercourse, by virtue of
the act of France." 2
It is obvious that this mode of treating the subject regards the legal
effect of the acts of the belligerent Powers as to each other, as determin-
ing incidentally their legal effect upon neutrals.
Such a doctrine has some support in the principles of municipal law.
Thus if a man, acting reasonably and without negligence, in self-defence
fires a pistol at an assailant, and the ball accidentally wounds a by-
2 The Fox, Edw. 311; Roscoe's Prize Cases, II, 61.
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stander, he cannot recover for the injury.3 But if it is to gain a place
in the law of nations it must be by adjudications not proceeding solely
from an official agency of one of the contending parties or of his sovereign,
in a cause dependent on the official acts of that Power.
The precise question decided by Sir William Scott is likely to come
up again in consequence of the orders affebting neutral commerce,
issued by Germany, France, and Great Britain during the present wars.
Great Britain early annofmced her intention to adhere to the rules
stated in the Declaration of London, except as to certain of them re-
garding contraband. Germany at first accepted the Declaration un-
reservedly, by incorporating its provisions, on September 13, 1914, into
the German prize court regulations. Its later orders, as well as those
of France and Great Britain, are quite inconsistent with the principles
laid down at London. "War zones" and "radiuses of activity" far out-
side of any territorial waters have been proclaimed by each, in which
neutral ships must not go, or go, if at all, at serious risk to life and
property. Some American ships are already in British prize courts.
Two Dutch ships, sailing in forbidden waters, have been seized by
Germany and taken into Zeebrugge in Belgium, where they would nat-
urally come before a German military prize court. Would its jurisdic-
tion be judged by the rule that the Supreme Court of the United States
has laid down, that "neither the President nor any military officer can
establish a court in a conquered country, and authorize it to decide upon
the rights of the United States, or of individuals in prize cases, nor to
administer the laws of nations.4
Can a belligerent reduce the rights of neutrals, as defined by interna-
tional law, by a self-framed order primarily designed as an act of hos-
tility towards the other belligerent; or was Judge Peters right, in 1794,
when he declared that "no one nation has the right to dictate to the
rest by its own ordinances what shall be the law of nations, the principles
whereof must be founded in justice, and established by common usage
and consent" ? 5
3Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. Reports, 75.
4 Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. (U. S.) Rep. 498, 515. Cf. The Grapeshot, 9
Wallace's Rep., 129.
5 Hollingsworth v. The Betsey, 2 Peters' Adm. Rep. 340.
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It is probable that in the magnitude of the interests involved the prize
litigation, present and to come, incident to the present wars, will surpass
that of any previous time. The assumption by the United States of
the poiition of an underwriter will add new complications.
Our government informed Germany last fall, that in any controversy
which might arise over questions of contraband and other points covered
by the Declaration of London, we should rest the American position on
our rights under international law, as interpreted by traditional Amer-
ican policy up to the time when that Declaration was signed in 1909.
This inevitably brought on a conflict of laws; and it is a conflict which
concerns the world, for international law is the joint creation of the
world.
Venezuela, in December, 1914, proposed to the Governing Board of
the Pan-American Union, and that Union is now understood to be con-
sidering, the calling of a conference of all the neutral Powers, to formu-
late a general code defining the rights and responsibilities of neutral
nations in time of war.
This project of setting some nations to frame laws for all, and to
make it a matter of joint action, is hardly likely to receive much
favor.
One much more feasible was suggested, in March, 1915, by Sir John
Macdonell, the distinguished Professor of Comparative Law in Univer-
sity College, London. Referring to the latest Order in Council of Great
Britain, he writes to the Nation that if it "is to be put into operation
on a large scale, the proper complement to it is an Anglo-American con-
vention by which questions arising under the new order might, along
with other matters affecting American claimants in our prize courts, be
referred to a joint tribunal."
Such a mode of procedure might naturally take the shape of an Inter-
national Court of Appeal in Prize Cases, similar in principle to that
planned by the twelfth Convention of the Hague Conference of 1907,
but confined to the two nations in the world whose jurisprudence is
most closely identical, and rests on institutions of most nearly the same
character.
The tribunal could be composed of three members, one appointed by
each Power, and one selected by them, or in case of their failure to
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agree, by lot from a list made up of an equal number of names submitted
by each government.
The judicial power of the United States, no doubt, cannot be bar-
gained away. But what is that power? It is settled that it is ziot ex-
ercised by the courts of our Territories. It is not exercised by our rep-
resentatives in the present international Hague tribunal. Aside from
this, however, the Anglo-American treaty which is here suggested
could and naturally would be drawn up on the lines intimated in the
reservation made by the United States in assenting to the Convention
for the International Court of Appeal in Prize Cases. If a decree in
admiralty is rendered which is not satisfactory to the losing party, re-
lief can always be given without disturbing the decree, itself. He can
appeal to his sovereign to urge a claim for justice through diplomatic
channels. If allowed by the other sovereign, the end desired will be
attained, not by a reversal of the judgment complained of, but by recog-
nizing that judicially it does settle the respective rights of the parties,
and further that it settles them in a wrong way.6
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest authority
known to our Constitution and laws for the judicial settlement of the
rights of the parties to a prize cause. But this has never been deemed
to prevent a recourse to diplomatic methods for, in effect, reviewing its
final judgments. A round dozen of them were thug examined by the
British-American Claims Commission, under the Treaty of Washington,
and half were pronounced inconsistent with "justice and equity." 7
The institution of an Anglo-American tribunal of the character sug-
gested would at once remove many natural causes of diplomatic con-
troversy between the two nations. It would also tend to the mainte-
nance of justice in the disposition of prize causes. In the nature of things,
a court of the captor ought not to have the final decision upon a ques-
tion of international law affecting the rights of its sovereign.
If such a tribunal proved to work smoothly, its decisions would win
6 Gray v. U. S., 21 Court of Claims Rep. 340, 401.
7 See the list given in Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, I,
478. See also Moore, International Law Digest, VII, 596, as to petitions to the
Court of Claims.
8 See Oppenheim, Int. Law, II, Section 385; Williams v. Armyhoyd, 7 Cranch's
Rep. 423.
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respect throughout the world, and in so doing would tend to lessen occa-
sions for diplomatic differences between belligerents and neutrals dur-
ing these wars; and between all the Powers after the return of peace.
Is it, to venture still farther, impossible that the erection of such a
larger tribunal as that proposed by the twelfth Convention of the Hague
Conference of 1907 might even now receive further and fairer considera-
tion? The need of something in the nature of an International Court of
Prize Appeals was never so urgent as at this hour. In face of present
conditions, there is less weight in the objections that were raised to its
institution in 1907 and 1909. The Declaration of London has already,
in large part, won a place among the canons of the law of nations. The
twelfth Convention might be put under stricter limitations. Its ma-
chinery might be simplified. More perhaps might be yielded to the
lesser Powers. The very attempt to open negotiations looking towards
its amendment and adoption, might and in all probability would have
an important effect in bringing these desolating wars to an earlier close.
It would at once bring even the belligerents to speaking terms. It might
result in a truce, pending the negotiations. If it took the shape of a
diplomatic conference, this would give an opportunity for an informal
exchange of opinion between the Powers participating in it, as to what
terms of peace might by possibility be arranged. It would recall the
attention of all to the fact that the ostensible cause of these wars was
not its real cause. Suppose that Serbia should now grant all the demands
in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, would it give any ground for hope
of a general peace? On the contrary, the Serbian incident has become
an almost negligible incident of a far past-far, as measured by the
rapid course of political events.
A century ago the United States were the only considerable commer-
cial Power not at war, but they were not in the number of the great
Powers. In 1915, when the new British Order in Council was issued,
they were again the only considerable commercial Power not at war,
but now a great Power. As such we have a freedom of suggestion and
weight of influence which gives us large opportunities. May not one of
these lie in the direction of promoting diplomatic pourparlers between
some or all of the belligerents, as to the possibility of now setting up
the International Priz6 Court of Appeal for the great Powers,-perhaps
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with some change of form, but pursuing the objects for which the scheme
has been devised, and perhaps leaving the door open for the lesser Powers
to adhere, one by one, if they see fit?
There is really no ground for saying that the question of the practi-
cability of such a step was bound up with that as to the ratification of
the Declaration of London, and therefore has been already considered
and disposed of. It was considered and disposed of only for the time
being and without the light thrown upon the subject by the wars that
were so soon to come. "Circumstances change cases." As was once
said by Henri Poincar6, "il n'y a plus des problmes r6solus et d'autres qui
ne le sont pas: il y a seulement des probl~mes pus ou mons rsolus."
SIMEoN E. B&Amwi.
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